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Oppression, Speech, and Mitsein in 
Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid's Tale
Perhaps one of the most remarkable claims to emerge from 
the scholarship on Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale is the 
suggestion that the novel champions a retrograde notion of fem­
ininity (that is, a concept of femininity that tends to be associated 
with concepts of the woman as a passive, demure other). I chal­
lenge this claim through an elaboration of the first-person narra­
tor’s ability to engage in genuine human solidarity, even when 
forced to endure the most draconian measures of immiseration. 
Offred—in often agonizing detail— specifies how the forces of 
the Republic of Gilead attempt to destroy her, yet these attempts 
fail in the narrow sense that throughout it all, Offred manages to 
retain some hope. This victory is significant, in the sense that it 
suggests a human solidarity in the face of near overwhelming ter­
ror. A clue to the nature of Offred’s heroism is found in the ubiq­
uity of the forces that are arrayed against her— at virtually every 
turn, in virtually every imaginable way, Offred’s identity is at­
tacked by the apparatus of the state. Despite this, Offred manages 
to retain her identity as a member of a resistance movement and 
embodies the courage to step forward into an ambiguous future. 
Offred highlights this ambiguity in the final fines of her first-per­
son narrative: “The van waits in the driveway. . . . Whether this is 
my end or a new beginning I have no way of knowing: I have 
given myself over into the hands of strangers, because it can’t be
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helped.”1 The seemingly totalizing force of the Other does not 
imply that Offred is reduced to the exemplar of a retrograde con­
cept of a woman. That Offred is the subject of immiseration is a 
given. That Offred is a victim is not. Offred is a rebel.
The critical controversy regarding the nature of Offred’s 
character reflects a disagreement between Simone de Beauvoir 
and Jean-Paul Sartre on the nature of our being with others 
(Mitsein). In his brief elucidation of a subject’s lived experience of 
shame, Sartre characterizes the Other as a hostile entity from 
which there is no escape. Simone de Beauvoir characterizes 
Mitsein in more positive terms. Mitsein, Beauvoir suggests, is our 
primary ontological relation (that is, it is the ontological given). 
As the ontological given, the Mitsein enjoys an axiological neutrality 
in the sense that any normative claim or evaluation is a predicate. 
For Beauvoir, our relation with others is ontologically ambiguous.
I suggest that Offred is a rebel because she can speak and be 
heard in an extremely oppressive society. This reflects the exist­
ence of a human solidarity—a solidarity that cannot be dimin­
ished, that cannot be broken. By the end of the narrative, Offred 
is not identifiable with the subdued, passive, retrograde concept 
of a woman. I claim that— contrary to the suggestions of several 
contemporary commentators on Atwood’s text— the narrator of 
The Handmaid’s Tale is a revolutionary feminist figure who, despite 
her immiseration by the Gileadean society, manages to tell her 
harrowing tale. The fact that Offred refuses to be ground down, 
so to speak, reflects Beauvoir’s concept of being with others.
Elaboration of the Dystopia of Gilead
The characters of Atwood’s novel languish in a dystopian 
hellscape.2 One of the principal practices in the Republic of
1. Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid's Tale (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986), 295. Hereafter 
cited as Atwood, Handmaid’s Tale.
2. The comparisons of Atwood’s novel to other dystopian fictions are many. Davidson 
characterizes the novel as “a feminist 1984.” Cathy N. Davidson, “A Feminist 1984,” Ms. 
(February 1986), 24—26. Feuer offers what is perhaps one of the most thorough comparisons of 
Atwood’s text to Orwell’s dystopia. Lois Feuer, “Calculus of Love and Nightmare: The Handmaid’s 
Tale and the Dystopian Tradition,” Critique 38.2 (Winter 1997): 83-95. Before writing The 
Handmaid’s Tale, Atwood stated her intention to write “a dystopia, a negative utopia.” Lucy M.
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Gilead is the regular, systematic, physical, psychological, and sex­
ual abuse of its female population. When the reader is introduced 
to Offred, she is sleeping on a cot in a gymnasium that has been 
converted into a “red center,” an urban concentration camp 
where fertile women are taught to be handmaids. The narrative 
voice describes an institutionalized environment in which virtu­
ally every aspect of Offred’s interiority is stripped away from her 
until she becomes identified with “something without shape or 
name” (Atwood, Handmaid’s Tale, 1). In one particularly excruci­
ating series of reflections, the narrative voice elaborates on the 
attempts to destroy her identity:
My name isn’t Offred, I have another name, which nobody uses now 
because it’s forbidden. I tell myself it doesn’t matter, your name is 
like your telephone number, useful only to others; but what I tell my­
self is wrong, it does matter. I keep the knowledge of this name like 
something hidden, some treasure I’ll come back to dig up, one day. I 
think of this name as buried. This name has an aura around it, like an 
amulet, some charm that’s survived from an unimaginably distant 
past. I lie in my single bed at night, with my eyes closed, and the name 
floats there behind my eyes, not quite within reach, shining in the 
dark. (Atwood, Handmaid’s Tale, 84)
The world of Gilead is governed by a theocratic governmental 
regime whose stipulations permeate every aspect of the social fab­
ric. The novel’s various settings—the home, the market, the doc­
tor’s office, the brothel—are sites of institutional control. Erving 
Goffman suggests that such overarching control effectively pro­
duces “total institutions” where individuals are cut off from every 
aspect of the extrainstitutional world, so that their concept of the 
self—that is, their very sense of identity—may be experimented 
on.’ In addition to being deprived of their names, the inmates at 
the red center are subjected to various forms of physical abuse, 
such as being electrocuted with cattle-prods, having their arms 
beaten (Atwood, Handmaid’s Tale, 194), and undergoing involun­
tary medical procedures (for example, enucleation of the eye) that
Friebert, “Control and Creativity: The Politics of Risk in Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid's Tale," 
in Critical Essays on Margaret Atwood, ed. Judith McCombs (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1988), 290.
3. Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation o f Mental Patients and Other Inmates 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), 22.
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are inflicted for punitive effect. Michel Foucault points out that 
totalitarian regimes—which seek to create or maintain a dysto­
pian mode of life— tend to create a strange nexus of torture and 
educational practices.4 5The Republic of Gilead tries to make its 
females forget all aspects of the lives they might have led before 
the time period represented in the novel (that is, the time period 
described as the past in the novel’s world). Darius Rejali charac­
terizes the attempts to inflict misery with the aim of destroying or 
diminishing an individual’s subjectivity as a form of penal torture. 
Rejali distinguishes between legal torture and penal torture. Legal 
torture is performed at the order of a judge, magistrate, or legally 
sanctioned administrative body such as a tribunal; penal torture is 
administered as a punishment during or after an investigation. 
Rejali explains that
in each case one must inquire whether physical torment is involved, 
whether the individual is helpless and detained, whether the agents 
who practice it are state or quasi-state officials, and whether it is put 
toward public purposes. If the answer in each case is yes, then it is 
torture, regardless of what it is called. If, in addition, the practice is 
legally authorized or authorized by custom, then it is a legal torture, 
and depending on whether it is practiced during investigation or after 
judgment, it is either judicial torture or penal torture. 3
The particular hell of Gilead is evidenced in the polymorphous 
torture visited on its women— a torture whose aim is the dimin- 
ishment and utter destruction of any memories that they might 
have of their previous identities as relatively sovereign subjects in 
the communities of pre-Gileadean society.
The oppressive nature of Gilead’s society is further adduced 
through reference to the narrator’s lived experience. Offred is af­
forded littie opportunity to celebrate any sense of difference or 
uniqueness. Iris Marion Young suggests that social practices that 
diminish difference reflect an oppressive society.6 Young charac­
terizes difference as involving any of three components: (a) a felt
4. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New 
York: Vintage, 1979), 87.
5. Darius Rejali, Torture and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007), 562.
6. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990), 10. 
Michel Foucault suggests a similar point when he notes that disciplinary societies use enhanced
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sense of particularity; (b) awareness of the diverse capabilities of 
one’s body and the variegated nature of human desire; and (c) an 
awareness of “the inexhaustibility of linguistic and social relations 
without a unitary, undifferentiated origin.” ' Offred’s narrative 
suggests that she is deprived of the possibility of realizing any of 
these. The way one dresses—or is forced to dress—is one of the 
primary means that one has of identifying oneself as different 
from others in one’s social group. Offred points out that her 
clothing is assigned to her, which deprives her of one of the pri­
mary means by which she could visually represent a sense of dif­
ference from the other handmaids. Throughout the novel, 
Offred’s sexual behaviors are rigorously codified, in the sense that 
the particular time, place, partner, and method of copulation are 
not chosen by her. Offred is raped repeatedly throughout the 
novel. The explicit external limitation of the objects of Offred’s 
sexual desire is elaborated with near-excruciating detail in the 
scene in which Serena Joy orders Offred to take the risk of vio­
lating the laws of the explicitly oppressive theocratic regime by 
submitting to the advances of the Commander’s driver (Atwood, 
Handmaid’s Tale, 205). The restriction of social relations is evi­
denced by the fact that handmaids are not permitted to go out in 
public without a “companion” who acts as their chaperone. 
Atwood has remarked that no aspect of the novel is pure fabrica­
tion in that events described in the novel have historical corre­
lates.* 78 One all too chillingly contemporary instance of the re­
striction of linguistic relations is the novel’s account of the
techniques of surveillance and examination to subjugate their populations. Elaborating on the
state’s “ritualization” of surveillance, Foucault writes, “It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that 
makes it possible to quantify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility
through which one differentiates them and judges them. That is why, in all the mechanisms of 
discipline, the examination is highly ritualized. In it are combined the ceremony of power and the
form of the experiment, the deployment of force and the establishment of truth. At the heart of
the procedure of discipline, it manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and
the objectification of those who are subjected.” Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 184—85.
7. Young notes that “some feminist and postmodern writers have suggested that a denial of 
difference structures Western reason, where difference means particularity, the heterogeneity of 
the body and affectivity, or the inexhaustibility of linguistic and social relations without a unitary, 
undifferentiated origin.” Young, Justice, 10.
8. Margaret Atwood, “Margaret Atwood: There’s Nothing in the Book That Has Not Already 
Happened,”’ interview by Katherine Govier, Quill and Quire 51.9 (September 1985): 66-67.
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phenomenon of public book burning.9 The diminishment of each 
of the three components of a felt sense of difference is one of the 
primary mechanisms by which an oppressive regime controls its 
citi2enry. Offred’s narration of her lived experience is a harrowing 
account of an immiserated, utterly subjugated person who is 
forcefully divested of her sense of individual difference.
Atwood specifies that, in the context of the dystopian literary 
genre, female characters tend to be portrayed as “sexless autom­
atons or rebels against the regime.”U) Given the explicidy dysto­
pian aspects of The Handmaid’s Tale, one might expect Offred to 
be similar to other female rebels in literature such as Orwell’s 
Julia, Defoe’s Moll Flanders, Hawthorne’s Hester Prynne, 
Huxley’s Julia, and Zamyatin’s 1-330, but Offred seems to have 
had every rebellious tendency beaten out of her. A brief survey 
of the critical literature on Offred’s capacities for rebellion 
demonstrates the scholarly consensus that Offred should be iden­
tified as a rather pusillanimous character.
Sandra Tome suggests that The Handmaid’s Tale is best under­
stood as the author’s expression of an explicidy conservative po­
litical agenda. Far from being an exemplar of “insurgent femi­
nism,” the character of Offred, according to Tome, should be 
understood as an advocate for a traditional concept of femininity. 
Tome explains, “For a novel so overtly offered as a piece of fem­
inist doctrine, The Handmaid’s Tale delivers a curiously, and, for 
Atwood, an unwontedly conservative interpretation of women’s 
exemplary social actions, advocating what looks like more tradi­
tional femininity than insurgent feminism.’’* 11 Citing the novel’s 
generally favorable reviews in Canada, and the author’s receipt of 
the Canadian Governor General’s Award, Tome falsely suggests 
that Atwood’s political views tend to reflect an explicit Canadian 
nationalist sentiment (that is, the uncontentious view that Canada 
should maintain its sovereign autonomy). Allan Weiss points out
9. Atwood, “Margaret Atwood,” 29.
10. Margaret Atwood, In Other Worlds: SF and the Human Imagination (New York: Nan A. 
Talese, 2011), 146.
11. Sandra Tome, ‘“The Missionary Position’: Feminism and Nationalism in Margaret 
Atwood’s The Handmaid's Tale’, ’ Canadian Literature 138-39 (1993): 73-87, 73-74.
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that Tome’s speculation about the nature of Atwood’s political 
views is irrelevant to any elaboration of the thematic content of 
the novel.12 Whether Atwood harbors Canadian nationalist senti­
ments is neither here nor there, in the sense that the content of a 
literary work of art is not reducible to the author’s biography. 
Were it the case that Atwood held a particular set of political be­
liefs, this would not imply that these are reflected in the writer’s 
fictional work.
Jennifer A. Wagner-Lawlor argues from more coherent logi­
cal ground when she suggests that Offred is, at best, “a problem­
atic heroine from a feminist standpoint” because her rebellions 
seem to be futile (that is, amounting to no concrete challenge to 
the oppressive regime, the alleviation of Offred’s suffering, or the 
possibility of ascribing any noble motive to her actions) . 13 
J. Brooks Bouson cautiously elucidates Offred’s putative com­
plicity when she suggests that Offred is “the victim of circum­
stances, not an active agent capable of directing the plot of her 
own life.” 14 Maroula Joannou suggests that Atwood’s narrator is 
most accurately characterized as a “solitary weeper” whose exist­
ence is defined by playing the role of the victim forever in flight 
from various oppressors.15 Though these characterizations of 
Offred as a broken woman seem not to be entirely misplaced in 
the sense that there is textual evidence that Offred explicitly 
claims that she wishes to be “abject”—it is incorrect to deduce 
from these that Offred has wholly accepted the role of victim.
12. Allen Weiss, “Offred’s Complicity and the Dystopian Tradition in Margaret Atwood’s The 
Handmaid's Tale” Studies in Canadian Literature 34.1 (January 2009): 120—41,121.
13. Wagner-Lawlor remarks that “Offred herself is a problematic heroine from the feminist 
standpoint. She is politically complacent before the Gileadean takeover— thus to some degree 
complicitous in it, as she is honest enough to acknowledge, at least in retrospect. Her final step 
into the Eyes’ black van can hardly be called a brave or political act, in as much as she has no real 
choice, not having in hand the means to kill herself, even if she wanted to, which she did not.” 
Jennifer A. Wagner-Lawlor, “From Irony to Affiliation in Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid's 
Tale” Critique 45.1 (Fall 2003): 83-96, 83.
14. J. Brooks Bouson, Brutal Choreographies: Oppositional Strategies and Narrative Design in the 
Novels of Margaret Atwood (Amherst: U of Massachusetts P, 1993), 154.
15. Maroula Joannou, ‘“Finding New Words and Creating New Methods’: Three Guineas and 
The Handmaid's Tale,” in Virginia Woolf and Fascism: Resisting the Dictators' Seduction, ed. Merry M. 
Pawlowski (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2001), 148.
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After witnessing the brutal murder of an insurgent and hearing of 
her companion’s suicide, Offred suggests that she would be con­
tent with the mere survival of a mere object divested from all 
sense of human solidarity. Atwood writes, “Everything they 
taught at the Red Center, everything I’ve resisted, comes flooding 
in. . . .  I resign my body freely, to the uses of others. They can do 
what they like with me. I am abject” (Atwood, Handmaid’s Tale, 
286). The key question is what Offred desires to be abject from? 
The content of the rest of the passage indicates that Offred does 
not want to be dehumanized (that is, she does not wish to be 
made into a “wingless angel”).16 Even in the direst of circum­
stances— even at her psychologically lowest point— Offred 
speaks a profound a desire to survive as a member of the human 
community.
Objecting to the characterization of Offred as a victim, 
Jeanne Campbell Reesman suggests that Offred’s act of recording 
her testimonial for future generations constitutes a concrete act 
of rebellion.17 Reesman’s defense of the claim that Offred is a 
rebel seems dubious in the sense that the “Historical Notes” sec­
tion of the novel alludes to the fact that the Republic of Gilead 
survived for many years following Offred’s death.18 There seems 
to be very little textual evidence that Offred’s testimony led to 
any sort of generalized political revolt. One’s ability to foment a 
political revolution is too rigid a criterion by which to assess 
whether one is a victim. If, in order not to be a victim, one would 
have to a start a political revolution, then all citizens living under 
the yoke of an oppressive regime would be victims solely because 
they did not take to the streets to lob Molotov cocktails at federal 
buildings— a demand that relies on a false restriction of the cate­
gory of nonvictim. Carol L. Breenan suggests that the correct cri­
terion for assessing Offred’s nature involves the character’s ability
16. Atwood, Handmaid's Tale, 331.
17. As Reesman explains, Offred’s “voice offers a moving testament of the power of language to 
transform reality in order to overcome the oppressive designs imposed by human beings.” Jeanne 
Campbell Reesman, “Dark Knowledge in The Handmaid's Tale” C E A  Critic53.3 (1991): 6-22, 6.
18. Offred was a handmaiden of Frederick J. Waterford, who was a “Commander” during 
the early period o f Gilead. Atwood, Handmaid's Tale, 181.
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to use language to express revolutionary sentiments. 19 At frequent 
points throughout her narrative, Offred elaborates that she will 
“not let the bastards grind her down.” 211 The expression of this 
revolutionary hope—not the ability to start a generalized political 
revolution—is the correct criterion to use in the assessment of 
Offred’s character.
A Disagreement about the Nature of Mitsein
By the end of the novel, we are led to conclude that Offred 
has died as a refugee. So great is the power of the Gileadean 
Other that we are compelled by the novel’s Professor Pieixoto to 
question the veracity of Offred’s testimonial. Our being with oth­
ers is fraught, in the sense that Sartre seems to suggest that our 
being with others is (a) ontologically primary and (b) necessarily 
involves conflict. In his discussion of shame in Being and Nothing­
ness, Sartre characterizes the Other negatively: the Other reduces 
an individual’s lived experience to servitude. Beauvoir is a bit 
more positive. Mitsein is rehabilitated with the observation that 
our being with the Others is precisely what allows us to avoid 
succumbing to the “facticity” 21 of a bleak world in which the in­
dividual is relegated to the diminished status of a thing among 
things (that is, entities deprived of any substantive means of en­
acting their freedom; they are deprived of any means of commu­
nication).
William L. McBride observes that Sartre’s elaboration of the 
Heideggerian concept of Mitsein is reflective of a worldview that
19. Carol L. Beran, “Images of Women’s Power in Contemporary Canadian Fiction by 
Women,” Studies in Canadian Literature 15.2 (1990): 55-76, 71.
20. The character of Offred reflects, “I pray silently: Nolite te bastardes carborundorum.” 
Atwood, Handmaid's Tale, 90.
21. Beauvoir illustrates the profound negativity of an existence reduced to “pure facticity” by 
quoting a novel written by a misanthrope: “Reduced to pure facticity, congealed in his immanence, 
cut off from his future, deprived of his transcendence and of the world which that transcendence 
discloses, a man no longer appears as anything more than a thing among things which can be 
subtracted from the collectivity of other things without its leaving upon the earth any trace of its 
absence.” Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman (Secaucus, NJ: 
Citadel P, 1948), 44-45.
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is almost one-sidedly pessimistic.22 Sartre suggests the most ex- 
plicidy negative account of the subject’s relation with the Other. 
Sartre identifies the Other as an inexorable, ontologically primor­
dial (that is, given) entity that continually pinions the individual 
under its gaze.23 The extent to which the gaze of the Other defines 
the subject’s lived experience is illustrated in Sartre’s observation 
that the subject’s (contrary) sensations of guilt and pride stem 
from the gaze of the Other.24 Here, the implication is that aspects 
of the subject’s identity are significantly shaped by an entity or 
group that is explicitly beyond the subject’s control. The Other is 
(a) ontically extrinsic; (b) axiologically primary, in the sense that it 
causes value; and (c) ontologically primary. Nancy Bauer elabo­
rates on the political aspects of the gaze of the Other when she 
notes that the Other effectively makes the subjects into slaves 
who are so completely immiserated as to willingly accept their 
own servitude.23 So comprehensive is the nature of the power of
22. Elaborating on the difference between Sartre’s and Beauvoir’s thought about Mitsein, 
McBride specifies that Sartre’s position reflected an attitude of “seriousness” that is ill-fitting to 
any ethical project. McBride writes that Beauvoir “was essentially more optimistic about the 
future.. . . Hers was a measured optimism to be sure, with no promise of some ‘final victory’ or 
end to the struggle, but there are numerous texts in which she takes a clearly more positive view 
than he about the possibilities of human love, of some genuine human community as captured in 
Heidegger’s concept of Mitsein (about which Sartre was almost never positive) and in short, about 
the human adventure itself. Years later, Sartre seemed to confirm that his early worldview had 
been the one-sidedly pessimistic type I am suggesting as a contrast with Beauvoir’s.” William L. 
McBride, “Taking a Distance: Exploring Some Points of Divergence between Beauvoir and 
Sartre,” in Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of Influence, ed. Christine Daigle and Jacob Golomb 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2009), 199.
23. Sartre observes that “for me the Other is first the being for whom I am an object; that is, 
the being through whom I gain my objectness. If I am to be able to conceive of even one of my 
properties in the objective mode, then the Other is already given. He is given not as a being of my 
universe but as a pure subject. Thus this pure subject which by definition I am unable to know— 
i.e., to posit as object—is always there out of reach and without distance whenever I try to grasp 
myself as object.” Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A  Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, trans. 
Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 270.
24. Sartre explains, “Both my shame and my pride stem from the fact that I have an ‘outside’ 
or ‘nature,’ a self which exists for the Other and which I am unable to determine or even to know.” 
Sartre, Being and Nothingness, xxxii.
25. “In the one short discussion of pride,” Bauer writes, Sartre “seems to suggest that, indeed, 
experiencing it in response to the Other’s Look leads not to a life-and-death struggle with the 
Other but to a complacent acceptance of oneself as nothing other than Being-for-Others. But 
because the self that is for-Others is inherently incapable of action—is .. . nothing other than the 
fixed object of the Other’s perception—to accept oneself as nothing other than Being-for-Others
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tiie Other that Sartre cautiously suggests that its “look” implies 
“a total metamorphosis of the world”26 in that it defines the con­
ceptual lens (that is, the objectivity) through which the world ob­
tains as something meaningful. Sartre’s claim is that the look of 
the Other determines the very set of criteria by which we make 
truth-claims about the nature of reality. Sartre explicitly claims 
that the look of the other involves the destruction of any sense 
of objectivity for the viewed subject.2 There is no axiologically 
neutral criterion by which to assess the world. Every claim that 
the gazed-upon subject may make to axiologically neutral truth is 
diminished, in that putatively neutral criteria— such as those that 
are used in the measurement of spatial distance or temporal du­
ration—are dependent upon an Other whose powers are so com­
prehensive that they penetrate to the very heart of the subject’s 
being (that is, the criteria by which the subject assesses the world 
are provided by the Other, which remains transcendent to her). 
The power of the Other to transform the nature of reality is so 
complete that, if remarked upon at all, it tends to be dismissed as 
the subject of a banal observation. This tendency is illustrated 
when Offred wakes up in the red center to notice that her concept 
of time— the seemingly objective measure of the duration of the 
motion of bodies—is entirely determined by the Other (Atwood, 
Handmaid’s Tale, 8). Instead of a duration measured by the regular 
progression of invariable units of time, Offred’s lived experience 
is a “blank time” (Atwood, Handmaid’s Tale, 70), whose indeter­
minate duration is defined by the orders of a transcendent other 
(that is, one of the novel’s “aunts”) or the irregular ringing of a 
church bell. In a universe so completely determined by the look 
of the Other, there is no aspect of reality that is independent.
is to deny the fundamental fact of one’s own subjectivity, of one’s own Being-for-Self.” Nancy 
Bauer, Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophy, and Feminism (New York: Columbia UP, 2001), 109.
26. Sartre writes, “The Other’s look touches me across the world and is not only a 
transformation of myself but a total metamorphosis of the world. I am looked-at in a world which 
is looked-at. In particular the Other’s look, which is a look-looking and not a look looked-at, 
denies my distances from objects and unfolds its own distances.” Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 279.
27. “The Other’s look as the necessary condition of my objectivity,” Sartre writes, “is the 
destruction of all objectivity for me.” Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 279.
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Beauvoir characterizes the subject’s relation with the other 
(that is, Mitsein) in a more positive light, insofar as our relation 
with others is not entirely negative (that is, not necessarily immis- 
erating). Though every concept of our world may be shaped in 
our being with others, these relations need not be characterized 
only as unmitigated antagonism. In the bleakness of the 
Gileadean regime, Offfed still manages to retain the hope of a 
less oppressive lived experience by thinking that someday Mayday 
rebels may overthrow the Gileadean regime or transport her 
safely to the borders of Canada—a land that, in the context of the 
novel, is free from the institutionalized misogyny, malevolence, 
and utterly feckless leadership that typifies the remains of the 
American republic. Offred manages genuine human solidarity in her 
conversations with Nick and Moira. Were Sartre’s concept of Mitsein 
wholly adequate, genuine human solidarity would not obtain.
In The Second Sex, Beauvoir generalizes the point that Claude 
Levi-Strauss makes in his critique of James G. Frazer’s analysis of 
Australian marriage customs28 to suggest that the female’s heter­
osexual relation to a male is a fundamental category of one’s lived 
experience.29 Though Beauvoir cautiously notes that an identifi­
cation of being with others as solely constituted by “solidarity and 
friendship” is inadequate in that it does not afford any means of 
elaborating on the heinous aspects of human relationships such 
as wars and explicit attempts to silence, degrade, erode, or under­
mine the freedom of the other, she also notes that the Mitsein in­
volves a recognition of the reciprocity of the relation.30 Were it
28. Claude Levi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship, ed. Rodney Needham, trans. James 
Harle Bell, John Richard von Sturmer, and Rodney Needham (Boston: Beacon P, 1969), 136.
29. Beauvoir explains that “the category of Other is as original as consciousness itself. The 
duality between Self and Other can be found in the most primitive societies, in the most ancient 
mythologies; this division did not always fall into the category of the division of the sexes, it was 
not based on any empirical given: this comes out in works like Granet’s on Chinese thought, and 
DumeziTs on India and Rome. In couples such as Varuna-Mitra, Uranus-Zeus, Sun-Moon, Day- 
Night, no feminine element is involved at the outset; neither in Good-Evil, auspicious and 
inauspicious, left and right, God and Lucifer; alterity is the fundamental category of human 
thought.” Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany- 
Chevallier (New York: Vintage, 2011), 27, ebook.
30. “The other consciousness,” Beauvoir writes, “has an opposing reciprocal claim: traveling, 
a local is shocked to realize that in neighboring countries locals view him as a foreigner; between 
villages, clans, nations, and classes there are wars, potlatches, agreements, treaties, and struggles
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the case that the Other constantly represented itself to the subject 
as a Sartrean “demonic double” 31 that aims at the subject’s dimin- 
ishment, then one would be hard pressed to account for any re­
lation of the self with the Other that results in flourishing—and 
such relations do happen.
In her detailed reading of Beauvoir’s elaboration of our being 
with others, Bauer elaborates on the nuanced difference between 
Sartre’s and Beauvoir’s concepts of Mitsein. Whereas Sartre has an 
explicitly pessimistic view of the relations with the other— that is, 
a view that conjures images of intractably hostile opponents who 
are “fundamentally at each other’s throats”32—Beauvoir tends to 
characterize our being with others as potentially something other 
than this.33 Though Beauvoir is admittedly vague about the details 
of one’s relation to others, this should not be taken as reflective 
of a weakness in her conceptualization of the phenomenon, in 
the sense that the ambiguity of the concept is reflective of the 
varied nature of one’s lived experience.34 Mitsein tends to be char­
acterized as the inexact coupling that is ontologically primary to 
all processes of individuation. Beauvoir writes:
Here again, the case of the human species cannot be reduced to any 
other; men do not define themselves first as individuals; men and 
women have never challenged each other in individual fights; the 
couple is an original Mitsein; and it is always a fixed or transitory ele­
ment of a wider collectivity; within these societies, who, the male or 
the female, is the more necessary for the species? In terms of gam­
etes, in terms of the biological functions of coitus and gestation, the
that remove the absolute meaning from the idea of the Other and bring out its relativity; whether 
one likes it or not, individuals and groups have no choice but to recognize the reciprocity of their 
relation.” Beauvoir, Second Sex, 28.
31. Jean-Paul Sartre, The Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume 1: Theory of Practical Ensembles, ed. 
Jonathan Ree, trans. Alan Sheridan Smith (London: New Left Books, 1976), 132.
32. Nancy Bauer, “Being With as Being Against: Heidegger Meets Hegel in The Second Sex,” 
Continental Philosophy Review 34.2 (2001): 129-49,131.
33. Bauer gives an elegant elucidation of this point: “A careful reading of The Second Sex, 
however, reveals that the claim that human beings harbour a ‘fundamental hostility toward every 
other consciousness’ does not entail for Beauvoir—as it does for Sartre—the impossibility of non- 
hostile human relations.” Bauer, “Being,” 131-32.
34. McBride clarifies Beauvoir’s concept of ambiguity as the “recognition of the grey areas, 
softening of the sharp lines, and emphasis on what is between, what is ultimately unclear.” 
McBride, “Taking a Distance,” 192.
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male principle creates to maintain and the female principle maintains 
to create: What becomes of this division in social life? For species 
attached to foreign bodies or to the substrata, for those to whom 
nature grants food abundantly and effortlessly, the role of the male is 
limited to fertilization; when it is necessary to search, chase, or fight 
to provide food needed for offspring, the male often helps with their 
maintenance; this help becomes absolutely indispensable in a species 
where children remain incapable of taking care of their own needs 
for a long period after the mother stops nursing them: the male’s 
work then takes on an extreme importance; the lives he brought forth 
could not maintain themselves without him.35
Overlooking the decidedly materialist tone of this passage— 
which, in fairness to Beauvoir, is taken from her thorough critique 
of biological reductionism (that is, the misguided theoretical at­
tempt to reduce all phenomena to biological interactions)— one 
notices that there is nothing ontologically prior to the Mitsein. In 
this sense, Beauvoir’s concept of Mitsein can be seen as an ana­
logue to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s characterization of the “flesh” 
as the ontologically primordial “element” of being.36 In The Ethics 
of Ambiguity, Beauvoir explicitly characterizes our being with oth­
ers (that is, our “collectivity”) as the ontologically primordial con­
dition— the given— on which the varied processes of our individ­
uation depend.3' The claim that Mitsein is the ontological first 
condition implies that it is axiologically neutral. Bauer suggests 
that Mitsein is the ambiguous mode of being in which people may 
value others and participate in the determination of their own 
value.38 Though Bauer cautiously notes that though an entity’s
35. Beauvoir, Second Sex, 70-71.
36. Merleau-Ponty explains that “the flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To 
designate it we should use the old term ‘element,’ in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, 
earth, and fire, that is, in the sense of a general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal 
individual and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is 
a fragment of being.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. 
Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1968), 139.
37. “Between the past which no longer is and the future which is not yet,” Beauvoir writes, 
“this moment when he exists is nothing. This privilege, which he alone possesses, of being a 
sovereign and unique subject amidst a universe of objects, is what he shares with all his fellow- 
men. In turn an object for others, he is nothing more than an individual in the collectivity on 
which he depends.” Beauvoir, Ethics of Ambiguity, 2.
38. Bauer, “Being,” 144.
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being with others does not imply “that beings are bonded to­
gether in some salutary way, ” 39 neither does it necessarily entail 
that beings are condemned to an inauthentic existence, in which 
each seeks to immiserate the other. Beauvoir’s concept of Mitsein 
is more positive than Sartre’s insofar as negative values are not 
inscribed on it in advance of a being’s lived experience. That value 
subsists from the Mitsein, allows for the possibility of positivity in 
one’s lived experience. If negative values were identified with 
Mitsein, then there would be no possibility of any sort of authentic 
relation to emerge. One of the outcomes of Beauvoir’s concept 
of our being with others is that positivity— characterized as the 
manifold ways that beings can speak, be heard, and not have their 
voice drowned out by a totalizing Other—does emerge.
Concluding Remarks
In The Second Sex, Beauvoir characterizes her project as the 
giving voice to the lived experience of women. In The Handmaid’s 
Tale, the first-person narrative voice—who elaborates her own 
lived experience in a world that mercilessly tries to silence her— 
is an expression of positivity. The fact that hers is a voice that is 
not silenced— to the extent that the handmaid’s tale exists as an 
ominous warning of how the human Mitsein could be diminished 
through the silencing of women (that is, condemning women to 
the facticity of mute objects without a demonstrable interior- 
ity)—is a testament to Offred’s status as a feminist icon. That 
Offred speaks, constituting her narrative in the most adverse of 
worlds, that she relates a tale, is her success in overcoming the 
retrograde concept of female as a demure other.
For Sartre, the Other is a terror in the sense that our being 
with others does not tend toward any liberation. Beauvoir’s con­
cept of Mitsein is more positive insofar as the struggles that hu­
mans face are not already condemned to failure. That Offred can 
communicate that she does not wish to be “beaten down”—that 
she can chronicle the abuses that she faces while retaining the 
hope that she will not be reduced to a brute thing among other
39. Bauer, “Being,” 144.
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things—is reflective of Beauvoir’s concept of being with others 
and a testament to Offred’s status as a revolutionary feminist 
icon.
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